EFFECT OF CEO DUALITY ON THE ASYMMETRIC BEHAVIOR OF SALES, GENERAL AND ADMINISTRATIVES EXPENSES

Abstract

This research aimed to analyze the effect of CEO duality on the asymmetric behavior of sales, general and administrative expenses (SGAE) of Brazilian public companies. The sample comprised 178 companies in the period 2012-2021. Descriptive statistics and hierarchical linear regression were used, being operationalized by the SPSS® software. The results demonstrated that companies managed by CEOs who also hold the position of member of the board of directors, faced with periods of falling sales, showed a greater degree of asymmetry in SGAE than companies where CEO duality does not occur. Therefore, these results may be related to practices of more aggressive reductions in SGAE carried out by managers with duality in periods of falling sales. As a theoretical contribution, this study provides evidence of the effect of CEO duality on the asymmetric behavior of SGAE in Brazilian public companies. As a practical contribution, this study can be useful for shareholders, members of boards of directors and members of audit committees, in the sense that, through the findings of this study, they can warn about the effect that CEO duality can have on the SGAE behavior of companies. It also helps auditors and market analysts consider in their work procedures the impact of CEO duality on companies' SGAE behavior.